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Whether Alleging "Motive and Opportunity" Can Satisfy
the Heightened Pleading Standards of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Much Ado About Nothing
Ray J. Grzebielski*
and Brian 0. O'Mara**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA,"
"Reform Act," or "Act")' was a major overhaul of the largely judi-
cially created litigation system that emerged from the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act ("34 Act"). 2 Starting with Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co. 3 in 1946, the federal courts recognized an implied private right of
action under § 10(b) 4 of the 34 Act and rule 10b-55 thereunder. This
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1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78-78mm (2000). In the 34 Act, Congress originally provided three express
private causes of action: § 9 for damages from manipulation on national securities exchanges, 15
U.S.C. § 78i (2000), § 18(a) for damages from materially false and misleading statements in re-
ports filed with the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") on which the plaintiff relied, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (a) (2000), and § 16(b) under which corporations can recover profits from short-
swing trading from traditional insiders, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
3. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange - . .. To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, or any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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cause of action became the preferred choice of plaintiffs in securities
fraud suits since it was not circumscribed by congressionally legislated
limits. 6
In 1971, twenty-five years after Kardon, the Supreme Court decided
its first case under rule 10b-5 and began to put its stamp on the param-
eters of these implied private actions for securities fraud.7 Early on,
the Supreme Court expressed concerns about the peculiarly vexatious
nature of securities fraud claims.8 While the Supreme Court has often
restrictively interpreted the scope of rule 10b-5 claims,9 the Court
could not easily stop baseless lawsuits. In the paradigm for an abusive
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
6. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), where the Supreme Court referenced
the Congressional limits on express causes of action under the 34 Act and the 1933 Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000), in order to inform its decision that simple negligence would not
support a private action under § 10(b). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730 (1975), where the Supreme Court stated:
Despite the contrast between the provisions of Rule l0b-5 and the numerous carefully
drawn express civil remedies provided in the Acts of both 1933 and 1934, it was held in
1946 by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that
there was an implied right of action under the Rule. This Court had no occasion to deal
with the subject until 25 years later, and at that time we confirmed with virtually no
discussion the overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals
that such a cause of action did exist (citations and footnote omitted).
7. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). To be sure, the
Supreme Court had decided cases involving other implied private rights of action under the
federal securities laws before 1971. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing
an implied private right of action to enforce § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000)); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (deciding what causal
relationship is necessary between false statements in a proxy statement and the vote on a merger
in an action to enforce § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9 (2002)).
8. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, where the Supreme Court held
that every plaintiff bringing a Rule 10b-5 action must be a purchaser or seller, the Court went on
to say:
There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule l0b-5 presents a dan-
ger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litiga-
tion in general.
Judge Friendly in commenting on another aspect of Rule 10b-5 litigation has referred to
the possibility that unduly expansive imposition of civil liability 'will lead to large judg-
ments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators
and their lawyers.'
Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 (only purchasers or sellers could sue privately
under Rule 10b-5); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (private party must show more than simple negli-
gence to prevail under Rule lOb-5); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (in private lawsuit, no liability for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule
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lawsuit, a corporation issues a statement that is a negative surprise for
the market. The corporation's stock falls and several shareholder se-
curities fraud class actions are filed.' 0 Plaintiffs commence discovery
immediately which serves to impose costs on the corporation and acts
as a means of investigating whether there might be securities fraud."'
Without a prompt dismissal of the lawsuits, corporations might settle
for large sums even where the claims had little merit in order to mini-
mize corporate defense costs.1 2
One major aim of the PSLRA was to prevent such "abusive and
meritless lawsuits". 13 One device designed to deter meritless lawsuits
is a heightened pleading standard for private securities fraud cases.
The PSLRA provides:
[i]n any private action arising under this chapter in which the plain-
tiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with re-
spect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind. 14
lOb-5). But see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (where securities are traded widely,
plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 do not have to show individual reliance).
10. See Michael A. Dorelli, Striking Back at "Extortionate" Securities Litigation: Silicon
Graphics Leads the Way to a Truly Heightened and Uniform Pleading Standard, 31 IND. L. REV.
1189, 1191 (1998), for a description of one such filing.
11. Id. at 1189-90. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court observed:
The potential for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure may likewise exist in [rule 10b-5 cases] to a greater extent than they
do in other litigation. The prospect of extensive deposition of the defendant's officers
and associates and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of business
documents, is a common occurrence in this and similar types of litigation. To the extent
that this process eventually produces relevant evidence which is useful in determining
the merits of the claims asserted by the parties, it bears the imprematur of those Rules
and of the many cases liberally interpreting them. But to the extent that it permits a
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evi-
dence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741.
12. Again, as the Supreme Court stated in Blue Chip Stamps:
[In the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a com-
plaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a
settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial
so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or
summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal
business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted).
13. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). By the plain language of this section, Congress did not
specify what state of mind would lead to liability, but left the question of state of mind for
judicial determination. John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform,
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The PSLRA also provides a stay on discovery until motions to dismiss
on the adequacy of the pleadings are decided. 15 This pleading stan-
dard would thus keep plaintiffs with baseless suits from reaching the
discovery stage; thereby reducing the sums such suits could potentially
extract in settlement. 16 Effectively, plaintiffs must investigate the
merits of any claim before filing a lawsuit.
The Circuits have taken divergent positions in interpreting the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standard for scienter. While the Sec-
ond Circuit and others adopted the belief that Congress intended to
codify the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA test, which can be satisfied by
showing "motive and opportunity,"' 7 the Ninth Circuit rejected it and
Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101 (1996);
Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (1998).
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court decided that for implied private rights of action under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, simple negligence is insufficient for liability. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193. At
one point the Supreme Court defined the requisite scienter as "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. The Supreme Court expressly reserved the
question of whether reckless behavior would be sufficient for civil liability under Rule lOb-5. Id.
Between the Hlocifelder decision and the adoption of the PSLRA, those circuits that considered
whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 uniformly
agreed that recklessness did indeed satisfy the requirement. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting the Sundstrand recklessness standard); In
re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989) ("recklessness on the part of
a defendant meets the scienter requirement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); McDonald v.
Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989) ("showing of 'severe recklessness'
satisfies the scienter requirement"); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("Congress intended to create civil liability when one recklessly violates 10(b).");
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982) (recklessness satisfies the scienter require-
ment); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he scienter element may be
satisfied by proof of reckless conduct."); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033
(7th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Sundstrand] (defining recklessness for the purposes of securities
fraud). In the Sundstrand opinion, the court stated:
[R]eckl~ss[ness] .. .may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it.
Id. at 1045. Since Sundstrand, most courts have adopted the Seventh Circuit's recklessness stan-
dard. This, however, is not the topic of this paper and therefore will only briefly be discussed in
the notes.
15. The PSLRA provides that discovery "be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party." See 15 U.S.C. § 78-
u4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
16. See Dorelli, supra note 10, at 1194-95.
17. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs., 166 F. 3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting the
pleading standard of the Reform Act to be the same standard as that in the Second Circuit); see
also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F. 3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) (adopting the position
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took the view that Congress intended a standard more stringent than
that existing in the Second Circuit. 18 Still, a third group, represented
by the Sixth Circuit, takes an approach, which at first glance, appears
to be somewhere in the middle. 19
Part II begins with a brief summary of the two pleading standards in
use prior to the enactment of the PSLRA. 20 Part III outlines the legis-
lative history of the PSLRA relating to the heightened pleading stan-
dard. 21 Part III then explores the current disagreement among the
circuits regarding the pleading standard for scienter under the
PSLRA. 22 The divergence of standards revolves around whether a
defendant's decision to plead motive and opportunity gives rise to a
strong inference of scienter. Part IV discusses the strengths and weak-
nesses of each of the three positions. 23 Specifically, Part V argues that
the standards used by the Second and Sixth Circuits are functionally
the same and that the Ninth Circuit's standard should be rejected.
II. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995
A. Pre-PSLRA Pleading Standards
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, the federal circuit courts of ap-
peal had adopted one of two different requirements for plaintiffs to
plead fraud under rule 10b-5, in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 24
The circuits relied on Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which provides that "in all averments of fraud and mistake the
underlying circumstances shall be pleaded with particularity," but
established by the Second Circuit); Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir.
1997).
18. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g and
reh'g en banc denied, 195 F. 3d 591 (9th Cir. 1999).
19. See, e.g., In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999); Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-38 (discussing the pleading standards used by the
Second and the Ninth Circuits prior to the enactment of the PSLRA).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 39-77 (discussing the legislative history of the PSLRA).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 78-104 (discussing the various interpretations used by
the circuits to apply the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 105-146 (analyzing the various approaches used by the
circuits).
24. Compare In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999), and Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs., 166 F.3d 529, 538
(2d Cir. 1999), with In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994), and In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 973-74, rehg and rehg en banc denied, 195 F.3d
591 (9th Cir. 1999).
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"[malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person
may be averred generally. '25
Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit's pleading standard was
said to be the most stringent standard employed by any circuit. 26 This
standard was an attempt to limit the number of frivolous securities
fraud suits filed.2 7 Under this standard, coupling factual statements
alleging fraud with conclusory allegations that the defendant was reck-
less, or had knowledge of falsity, would not withstand a motion to
dismiss.28 In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,29 the Second
Circuit held that the facts alleged in a securities fraud complaint must
give rise to a "strong inference of fraudulent intent. '30 Later, in
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc.,31 the Second Circuit amplified its
pleading standard by holding that a plaintiff may plead scienter if he/
she alleges either "motive and opportunity" on the part of the defen-
dant to commit fraud; or "facts that constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. ' 32 In order to
plead "motive", plaintiff had to show "concrete benefits that could be
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondis-
closures alleged, ' 33 while pleading "opportunity" would require show-
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition[s] of [the] mind of a person may be averred generally."
26. In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534 (stating that the Second Circuit's standard was the
most stringent pleading standard prior to the enactment of the PSLRA); see also Olson, supra
note 14, at 1108.
27. See Joseph T. Phillips, A New Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 976 (2001); In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546 ("We are not
permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of doing
so."). Other developments under Rule 10b-5 are the result, at least in part, of judicial concern
over frivolous lawsuits under the rule. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), the Supreme Court held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities can enforce
Rule lOb-5 in part on the policy grounds that this requirement would limit the number of vexa-
tious lawsuits under the rule. Some courts have adopted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which
enables a court to dispose of claims of misleading statements when there is sufficient cautionary
language. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig. - Taj Mahal Litig. (Kaufman v.
Trump's Castle Funding), 7 F.3d 357, 371-74 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Gollomp v.
Trump, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994); Cf. Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994). The
PSLRA contains provisions similar to this doctrine in providing safe harbors from litigation risks
for forward looking statements in § 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000).
28. In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 535.
29. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 268 (quoting O'Brien v. Nat'l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.
1991)).
31. 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 1128 (citing In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69).
33. Id. at 1130.
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ing "the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by
the means alleged."'34
The Ninth Circuit's standard, on the other hand, was a much less
demanding pleading standard than the Second Circuit's. 35 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that Rule 9(b) does not require "any particularity
in connection with an averment of intent, knowledge or condition of
the mind."' 36 To meet the burden of pleading a securities fraud claim
in the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff was simply required to give a descrip-
tion of circumstances alleged to constitute fraud with an accompany-
ing conclusory statement that those actions were fraudulent. 37 A
plaintiff bringing a securities fraud suit in the Ninth Circuit could,
therefore, survive a motion to dismiss by alleging state of mind with
no particular factual basis.38
B. Legislative History of the Heightened
Pleading Standard in the PSLRA
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
December of 1995. The PSLRA was enacted to "protect investors,
issuers, and all who are associated with [the] capital markets from
abusive securities litigation. '39 Among other things, the Reform Act
imposed higher pleading standards, and stayed discovery during the
determination of any motion to dismiss for failing to meet those stan-
34. Id.
35. William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(B)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 893, 905 (1996).
36. Id. (emphasis omitted). The purposes of Rule 9(b) are "to provide a defendant with fair
notice of a plaintiff's claim, to safeguard a defendant's reputation from 'improvident charges of
wrongdoing,' and to protect a defendant against the institution of a strike suit." See Olson, supra
note 14, at 1108.
37. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546. In GlenFed, the Ninth Circuit held that a
plaintiff could plead scienter with conclusory allegations as long as the complaint set forth the
circumstances indicating the fraudulent nature of the statements. Id. at 1548-49. The Court in
GlenFed allowed a plaintiff to draw on "contemporaneous statements or conditions" to demon-
strate why statements were false when made, and "allegations of specific problems undermining
a defendant's optimistic claims suffice to explain how the claims are false." Id. at 1549.
38. Id. at 1546-47; see also Phillips, supra note 27 at 976.
39. H.R. CONF. REji. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
2003]
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dards. 40 These hurdles made bringing a shareholders' lawsuit more
difficult.41
The Conference Committee based the need for a heightened plead-
ing standard on two findings. First, the Committee felt the require-
ment of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which
requires plaintiffs to "plead with particularity" when alleging fraud,
had failed to prevent abusive securities litigation. Secondly, the fed-
eral courts of appeal had split over the interpretation of 9(b)'s plead-
ing requirements and Congress felt that a new pleading standard
would bring desired uniformity.42
The history of the Reform Act is rather complicated. Originally
there were two versions of the bill, one from the House of Represent-
atives43 and the other from the Senate. 44 The first draft of the Act was
introduced in the House of Representatives. 45 The House's version,
H.R. 1058, did not adopt the Second Circuit pleading standard but,
instead, required the plaintiff to plead specific facts which demon-
strate the state of mind of each defendant. 46 The Conference Com-
mittee ultimately amended this version of the bill in favor of the
language found in the Senate's version. 47
Senator Pete Domenici introduced the Senate version of the
PSLRA, Senate bill 240, on January 18, 1995, where it was sent to the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs for hearings. 48 Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). The PSLRA also made it easier for courts to grant
sanctions against plaintiffs in securities actions, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c), limited joint and several
liability, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e), prescribed strict causation standards, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4),
placed limitations on securities class actions, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a), and provided a "safe harbor"
for forward-looking statements that prove to be false. See Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders'
Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, U. CHI.
L. REV. 1035, 1041-51 (2001); Thad A. Davis, A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement, 32
CuMB. L. REV. 69, 79 (2001-2002).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 35 at 931 (explaining the state
of mind pleading standard under proposed § 10A).
42. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 42-43 (quoting testimony of former SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden); see also Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong. 233,
234-35 (1995) (describing the Ninth Circuit's refusal to apply the Second Circuit's pleading
standard).
43. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. Tit. 11 (1995).
44. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 1 (1995).
45. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. Tit. 11 (1995). It also raised the standard of scienter to require that a
defendant act knowingly for liability to attach. H.R. 10, § 204.
46. Id. ("[Tlhe complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each
defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred.")
47. Miest, supra note 14, at 1113.
48. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 1.
[Vol. 1:313
2003] PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT 321
SEC, testified before the Subcommittee that it was his belief that the
pleading standard "should . . . conform to [that of] the Second Cir-
cuit."'49 The Senate Banking Committee then added the Second Cir-
cuit's test of "strong inference" of state of mind to unify the scienter
requirements of all of the circuits. 50 The Banking Committee, how-
ever, did not adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation of the pleading
standard,51 but it did state that Courts "may find the [Second Cir-
cuit's] body of [case] law instructive. 52
The full Senate amended Senate Bill 240 in June 1995 at the
prompting of Senator Arlen Specter.5 3 Senator Specter attempted to
make the law's reliance on the Second Circuit tests more explicit. He
offered a floor amendment that provided:
2) [s]trong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind may be established either -
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence
of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. 54
The Specter amendment included language defining how a "strong
inference" of scienter could be alleged, codified the Second Circuit's
"motive and opportunity" test, and expressly provided for liability for
reckless behavior.55 "Senator Specter reasoned that without this [lan-
guage], the strong-inference-of-scienter standard posed an impossible
49. S. REP. No. 104-50 at 231, 235-36 (Statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission indicating that he favored the Second Circuit's pleading requirement
and favored codifying the Seventh Circuit's definition of recklessness. According to the Chair-
man Levitt: "it is unrealistic to expect a plaintiff, at the commencement of an action, to be able
to present facts specifically demonstrating that a defendant acted with the requisite state of
mind. Indeed, in most cases it may be impossible at the pleading stage, before any discovery has
been taken, to meet such a burden").
50. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15. ("[Tlhe Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the
Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a 'strong inference' of [the]
defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's




53. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (Senator Specter's proposed amendment).
54. 141 CoNO. REC. S9222 (1995).
55. 141 CoNG. REc. S9170 ("[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind may be established either (A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both
motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or (B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circum-
stantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.).
322 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
task for plaintiffs. 'How do you get into somebody else's head?' he
asked. "56
Senator D'Amato, the Senate Banking Committee Chairman, op-
posed the Specter amendment saying that it "placed too great a bur-
den" on plaintiffs because it limited the ways in which scienter can be
plead and "straightjackets the court." 57 His opposition seems to be
based more on a concern that the Specter amendment would preclude
otherwise acceptable ways of alleging scienter by limiting the standard
solely to the motive and opportunity test, rather than an attack on the
use of motive and opportunity to plead the required level of scien-
ter.58 Senator Bennett, who also served on the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, took a similar view in stating his own objection. Bennett felt
that it was preferable to give the courts the ability to determine what
fact patterns would satisfy the scienter standard.5 9 The Senate ulti-
mately adopted the Specter amendment over these objections60 and
the Senate's version of the Reform Act, with the Specter amendment,
made its way to the House-Senate Conference Committee 6' for recon-
ciliation with the House version.
The Conference Committee sorted out the differences between the
House and the Senate version by looking at the Second Circuit's
pleading standard, while referring to it as "the most stringent pleading
standard. '62 The Conference Committee took the language of the
Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA standard, which required a plaintiff to
state facts that indicate a "'strong inference' of the defendant's fraud-
ulent intent, '63 and added the phrase "with particularity". This new
standard required that the plaintiff "shall, with respect to each act or
omission ... state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
56. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 657 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing
141 CONG. REc. 17424 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
57. 141 CONo. REc. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (Senator D'Amato's statement saying that
"S. 240 codifies the second circuit [sic] pleading standard, but this amendment goes further, to
say precisely what evidence a party may present to show a strong inference of fraudulent intent.
I think this straitjackets the court.").
58. Id.
59. Id. ("My understanding ... is that ... the committee decided they wanted to codify the
standard from the second circuit [sic]. Now, the committee intentionally did not provide lan-
guage to give guidance on exactly what evidence would be sufficient to prove facts giving rise to
a strong inference of fraud. They felt that adopting the standard would be sufficient [and] that
with the second circuit [sic] standard being written into the bill, it was best to stop at that point
and allow the courts then the latitude that would come beyond that point.").
60. 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
61. The Conference Committee consists of House and Senate managers charged with recon-
ciling differences between the House and Senate bills.
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
63. Id.
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ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. ' 64 Ulti-
mately, the Specter amendment was eliminated 65 and the "motive and
opportunity" language was removed. The Committee explained, "be-
cause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing plead-
ing requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard. '66
Soon after, the amended version of H.R. 1058 was presented to the
President for approval. President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA on De-
cember 19, 1995.67 Although the President said he supported the need
for securities litigation reform, he stated, "the pleading requirements
of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of mind
impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being
heard in Federal courts. ' 68 The President indicated that both deletion
of the Specter amendment, resulting in the omission of the Second
Circuit standard from the language of the PSLRA, and the language
in the Statement of Managers, indicating that the Committee wished
to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirement, led the President
to believe that the intent of Congress in passing the bill was to create a
higher pleading standard than that already in existence in the Second
Circuit.69
Subsequent to Clinton's veto, the bill was debated once more and
Congress voted to override the veto. On December 22, 1995, H.R.
1058, as revised by the Conference Committee and without the Spec-
ter amendment, became Public Law No. 104-67, "The Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995."70
The most controversial issue that Congress faced when drafting the
PSLRA was determining the level of specificity with which plaintiffs
would be required to plead scienter in order to survive a motion to
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 1-30 (Conference Committee's approved version of the PSLRA without the Specter
Amendment.).
66. H.R. REP. No. 104-369 (Nov. 28, 1995). Another consequence of the removal of the Spec-
ter amendment was that the PSLRA failed to define both the required state of mind and what
must be alleged to prove it. Many of the members of Congress felt that the PSLRA would not
make any changes to the state of mind requirements of existing law when removing the Specter
Amendment. See id. at 950 (The Statement of the Managers indicates that the PSLRA was not
going to alter the existing law regarding the state of mind requirement.).
67. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210, 2211 (Dec. 19, 1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. ("I will support a bill that submits all plaintiffs to the tough pleading standards of the
Second Circuit, but I am not prepared to go beyond that.").
70. 141 CONG. REC. H15 223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (The House vote was 319 to 100);
141 CONG. REC. S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (The Senate vote was 68 to 30).
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dismiss. 71 The goal was to end the disparity between the circuits72 and
"erect procedural barriers to prevent [opportunistic] plaintiffs from
asserting baseless securities fraud claims" 73 which would, in turn, curb
the perceived problem of abusive litigation. 74 "Rule 9(b)'s provision
allowing state of mind to be averred generally conflicts with the Re-
form Act's requirement that plaintiffs 'state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference' of scienter. ' 75 Under the PSLRA,
the lenient standard of GlenFed76 no longer constitutes an adequate
pleading requirement for scienter in §10(b) and 10b-5 cases.77
While it is clear that the GlenFed test is no longer the standard,
what is not clear is to what extent Congress adopted the views of the
Second Circuit. Congress did use the Second Circuit's "strong infer-
ence" test, but what was less clear is whether Congress expected the
federal courts to accept that alleging "motive and opportunity" would
satisfy the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.
III. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HEIGHTENED
PLEADING STANDARD
This ambiguous legislative history and nonspecific legislative lan-
guage has led to three interpretations 78 of the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standard. A discussion of the three variations is essential to
an understanding of the differing views of the PSLRA. 79
71. Miest, supra note 14, at 1112.
72. See Id. at 930.
73. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
74. See, e.g., Erin Brady, Determining the Proper Pleading Standard Under the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 After In Re Silicon Graphic, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 477 (2001).
75. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999).
76. See discussion on Pre-PSLRA pleading standards supra text accompanying notes 24-38.
77. See, e.g., Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
78. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., F. 3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting the Pre-
PSLRA Second Circuit standard where plaintiff must plead either motive and opportunity or
conscious recklessness); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534-35 (following Second Circuit view
in Press); In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) (adopting a modified
Second Circuit standard where although bare assertions of motive and opportunity may be rele-
vant to showing of scienter, without more, they are not sufficient to demonstrate the required
state of mind); In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 973-74, reh'g and rehg en banc denied, 195 F.
3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999) (Court rejected the Second Circuit standard and held that the motive and
opportunity test is no longer applicable. Plaintiffs must now plead specific facts indicating at
least a degree of recklessness suggesting actual intent).
79. Some circuits have declined to adopt a standard when the facts of the pleading in the case
do not rise to a level that would survive even the Second Circuit's standard. See, e.g., Phillips v.
LCI Int'l, Inc. 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999) (Court did not address the issue of which plead-
ing standard best reflected Congress' intent because it found that the plaintiffs failed to allege
facts sufficient to meet even the most lenient standard possible under the PSLRA - the Second
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A. Second Circuit
In February 1999, the Second Circuit in Press v. Chemical Invest-
ment Services8° became the first federal appellate court to decide what
Congress meant when it enacted the PSLRA pleading requirement for
scienter. Donald Press purchased a Treasury bill from Chemical for
$99,488.42, which, after six months would mature and be valued at
$102,000.81 Press brought a claim against Chemical under §10(b) be-
cause the firm had delayed paying funds to him when the T-bill ma-
tured.82 To plead scienter, Press alleged that Chemical had a motive
to keep possession of the T-bill proceeds for its own use, and that the
broker had the opportunity to do so because the firm controlled the
money at all times. 83
In addressing whether Press adequately pleaded scienter, the Press
court treated the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA as
merely codifying the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA standards.8 4 The
court stated that to satisfy the pleading requirement, a plaintiff must
either "allege facts to show that 'defendants had both motive and op-
portunity to commit fraud"' or "allege facts that 'constitute strong cir-
cumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.' ' 85
The court recognized that its pre-PSLRA standards were lenient.86
The Second Circuit felt that the standard could not be any higher be-
cause it would create a nearly impossible pleading standard where the
"intent" of a corporation would be at issue.87 Even though the Press
court found that the plaintiff "barely alleged motive and opportunity,"
it held that the pleading standard was nonetheless satisfied.
The Press opinion lacked much in the way of analysis. In fact, the
court ignored the purpose of the PSLRA pleading standard coupled
with the stay on discovery pending any motion to dismiss. The court
Circuit' s test). See also In re Criimi Mae, Inc. Sec. Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 652, 659 (D. Md. 2000)
("this court need not decide the appropriate standard for pleading under the PSLRA because
the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the Second Circuit standard").
80. 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 532.
82. Id. at 533. Press' claim against Chemical was based on three theories. First, Chemical
failed to disclose that the proceeds of the T-bill would not be available immediately upon matur-
ity, making the period for which the yield was calculated longer than indicated by Chemical
which made the disclosed interest rate inaccurate. Second, Press said that Chemical failed to tell
him that there was a markup of over $150 on the transaction. Finally, Press claimed that there
was a fiduciary duty to disclose the fee to him. Id.
83. Id.
84. Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
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recognized as motive the ubiquitous one of making money off the
transaction.88 Consequently, the Press pleading standard provided no
hurdle to plaintiff's discovery and ignored the Congressional intent to
use the pleading standard to curb baseless lawsuits. When Congress
said that the Second Circuit's case law may be instructive, it clearly
did not adopt all of it, particularly that which was "lenient". However,
the Press court provided the benchmark against which other circuits,
particularly the Ninth Circuit, interpreted the pleading standard of the
PSLRA. Since this interpretation provided little barrier to abusive
lawsuits, it did not serve the Congressional purpose of curbing such
lawsuits.
The next year, the Second Circuit revisited the issue and provided a
more detailed analysis. In Novak v. Kasaks,8 9 the court again held
that "the PSLRA effectively raised the nationwide pleading standard
to that previously existing in [the Second Circuit]."90 The Second Cir-
cuit again affirmed the two-part test of the Press court.91 However,
the Novak court effectively restricted the motive and opportunity test
for pleading scienter. The court said that "[p]laintiffs could not pro-
ceed on motives possessed by virtually all corporate insiders, ' 92 but
88. Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
89. 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
90. Id. at 310.
91. Id. at 311. The Third Circuit joined the Second Circuit when it reached a similar result in
In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 1999). Advanta was an issuer of
MasterCard and Visa credit cards who made its reputation by attracting new customers with its
"teaser rates." Id. at 528. (A "teaser rate" is an unusually low introductory interest rate, which
remains in effect for a limited period of time. At the end of this period, the rate returns to a
higher, permanent level.) Advanta, using this technique, grew rapidly and realized large profits.
Id. However, after announcing a $20 million loss, shareholders filed suit based on a claim that
Advanta had not fully disclosed these "risky" practices. Id. In Advanta, the court felt that "there
[was] little to gain in attempting to reconcile the conflicting expressions of legislative intent" and
instead looked to the "plain language" of the Act for its interpretation. Id. at 533. Stating that
the text of the Reform Act "closely mirrors language employed by the Second Circuit," ("We
believe that the use of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclusion that the Reform
Act establishes a pleading standard approximately equal in stringency to that of the Second Cir-
cuit.), particularly as it requires the plaintiff to allege facts supporting a 'strong inference' of
scienter," the Third Circuit held the use of standard "approximately equal to that of the Second
Circuit," although the pleading standard was in fact heightened with the addition of the words
"with particularity." /d. at 533-34 (emphasis added) ("[T]his interpretation is consistent with
Congress's [sic] stated intent of strengthening pleading requirements and deterring frivolous se-
curities litigation. [E]ven in jurisdictions already employing the Second Circuit standard, the
additional requirement that plaintiffs state facts 'with particularity' represents a heightening of
the standard."). Id. at 534. Furthermore, the court noted that except for the Act's "state with
particularity" requirement, the PSLRA is "virtually identical" to the Second Circuit standard.
Id. at 533.
92. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307.
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"had to allege that defendants benefited in some concrete and per-
sonal way from the purported fraud. 93
B. Ninth Circuit
Refusing to follow the lead of the Second Circuit in Press, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a more stringent pleading standard.94 In In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,95 ("Silicon Graphics") the court
looked almost solely at the legislative history to interpret the PSLRA
standard, determining that Congress "sought... to raise the pleading
standard above that in the Second Circuit. ' 96 The Silicon Graphics
court held that in order to meet the pleading standard called for in the
PSLRA, the plaintiff must "plead, in great detail, facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious
misconduct. '97
Addressing the Second Circuit's standard, the Silicon Graphics
court held that "although facts showing mere recklessness or a motive
to commit fraud and opportunity ... may provide some reasonable
inference of intent, they are not sufficient to establish a strong infer-
ence of deliberate recklessness. '98 To show a strong inference of de-
liberate recklessness, plaintiffs must now allege facts that "come
closer to demonstrating intent." 99
93. Id. at 307-08.
94. See Michael R. Dube, Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell In
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 42 B. C. L. REV. 619, 628 (2001).
95. 183 F. 3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 195 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 978.
97. Id. While the Ninth Circuit noted in Silicon Graphics that it would continue to adhere to
the Sundstrand definition of recklessness, the court changed its application of the Sundstrand
definition by indicating that recklessness would only satisfy scienter under §10(b) if "it reflects
some degree of intentional or conscious misconduct." Id. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, took the
position that the scienter requirement under the PSLRA is "deliberate recklessness." Id. at 977.
This new requirement changed the substantive requirements under §10(b) and pushed the Ninth
Circuit in a new direction. The new recklessness standard adopted by the Silicon Graphics court
contradicted the previous application of the Sundstrand definition, which called for a highly
unreasonable omission or extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the defendant must have been aware of it. See supra note 14; see also Howard v. Everex
Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (seeming to limit Silicon Graphics' holding to only
the pleading portion and holding that the substantive requirements under §10(b) had not been
altered).
98. Id. at 974.
99. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
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C. Sixth Circuit
In In re Comshare Inc. Securities Litigation,100 the Sixth Circuit
adopted a position that falls between the Second and the Ninth Cir-
cuits' standards. The court in Comshare analyzed the text of the stat-
ute and concluded that Congress' decision to use the "strong
inference" language compels the conclusion that the PSLRA adopted
a method of pleading, "approximately equal in stringency to that of
the Second Circuit."' 0' The court then went on to hold that "plaintiffs
may plead scienter . . . by alleging facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence of recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely establishing that
a defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit securities
fraud."' 1 2 The court, however, did recognize that facts establishing
motive and opportunity could be "relevant to pleading circumstances
from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be in-
ferred,"' 0 3 and could, perhaps, even "rise to the level of creating a
strong inference of reckless or knowing conduct."' 0 4  The Sixth Cir-
cuit test drops pleading of motive and opportunity as a separate suffi-
cient means to satisfy the pleading standard.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATIONS
A. Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit Tests as
Two Sides of the Same Coin
Although at first glance the Sixth Circuit seems to have adopted a
different and more stringent standard than the Second Circuit's by
dropping motive and opportunity as a separate test, the variation is
more apparent than real. The Second Circuit held to its pre-PSLRA
standard that a plaintiff may satisfy pleading requirements for scienter
by alleging motive and opportunity to commit fraud on the part of the
defendant; the Sixth Circuit held that the "bare pleading of motive
and opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute the pleading of a
strong inference of scienter."' 10 5 Case law has, however, qualified
what "motive and opportunity" can satisfy the pleading standard so
100. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs alleged that Comshare's officers were in-
volved in a scheme to defraud investors by selling stock while knowingly or recklessly disregard-
ing revenue recognition errors. Id. at 547.
101. Id. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 549. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 551.
104. In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
105. Id.
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that "motive and opportunity" means something far narrower than
what it implies. 10 6
First, motive and opportunity is not a two-part test for whether sci-
enter is adequately pleaded - opportunity is always present. The
named individual defendants will always have positions of responsibil-
ity for the alleged disclosure deficiencies. 10 7 Consequently, the two-
part rule reduces to one: adequacy of motive.
Not all alleged motives will be sufficient. For example, virtually all
corporate insiders possess certain motives, such as the desire to main-
tain a high corporate credit rating,a0 8 sustain the "appearance of cor-
porate profitability, or of the success of an investment," 10 9 the desire
to maintain a high stock price in order to increase executive compen-
sation, 10 or prolong the benefits of holding corporate office, " ' that
have all been held insufficient to meet the motive and opportunity
requirement. Additionally, the avoidance of personal liability has
been held to be "too speculative and conclusory to support scien-
ter."'1 2 Not even allegations of corporate insider trading before re-
lease of the correct information, in order to take advantage of
incorrectly priced stock, will necessarily be sufficient. Money and
greed are "ubiquitous motive[s]" and people in power always have the
opportunity to commit fraud.1' 3
The net effect of restrictively defining motive is to confine it to a
method of showing facts that can give rise to a strong inference of
scienter. Indeed, those courts considering motive and opportunity in
34 Act cases have held only that "facts showing a motive and opportu-
nity may adequately allege scienter," not that the existence of any mo-
tive and opportunity must support a strong inference of scienter
itself."t 4 Motive and opportunity is no longer in fact a separate, suffi-
cient test to determine whether scienter has been adequately
106. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 656 (8th Cir. 2001).
107. Miest, supra note 14, at 1130 (citing Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (2d Cir.
1994)).
108. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75
F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Thacker v. Madaphis
Corp., No. 97 CIV. 2849(DAB), 1998 WL 684595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (motive to
continue "aggressive acquisition of related companies" did not satisfy scienter); In re Crown Am.
Realty Trust Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A. 95-202J, 1997 WL 599299, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1997)
(motive to maintain access to capital markets insufficient to support scienter).
110. See Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1995).
111. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994).
112. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Carley Capi-
tal Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
114. In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551 (emphasis added).
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pleaded.lt 5 Consequently, the Circuits accepting motive and opportu-
nity as a separate test are administering a standard no different from
the 6th Circuit's.
What all the Circuits following the Second and Sixth Circuit tests
are doing is making a particularized examination of allegations in
complaints to determine whether what is alleged can be used to infer a
defendant's particular state of mind. Such an exercise is fact and judg-
ment intensive; consequently, the outcomes of individual cases may
not be consistent with each other. However, the net result accom-
plishes what Congress wanted: prevention of abusive lawsuits by in-
sisting there be grounds to sue before resorting to discovery
procedures.
B. The Ninth Circuit Analyzed
The Ninth Circuit standard fails as a result of its undue reliance on a
legislative history which does not support it, its combining a height-
ened scienter standard to the pleading standard and its inherent un-
certainty. The preliminary difficulty is deciding what Second Circuit
standard the Ninth Circuit used when it said, "Congress expressly re-
jected the Second Circuit case law interpreting the 'strong inference'
standard."' 1 6 As previously argued, a lenient interpretation of motive
and opportunity, as in Press, results in no heightened pleading stan-
dard. If Press were the standard, the Ninth Circuit was clearly war-
ranted in concluding that Congress wanted a more stringent standard.
The Ninth Circuit looked almost solely at the legislative history of
the PSLRA in holding that "Congress sought... to raise the pleading
standard above that in the Second Circuit."1t 7 In examining legisla-
tive history, the Ninth Circuit read the rejection of the Specter amend-
ment which prescribed "motive and opportunity" as sufficient for the
pleading standard, a footnote in the Conference Report, and Clinton's
veto as a rejection of the Second Circuit standard and, in particular, of
the "motive and opportunity" test.118 However, the totality of the
PSLRA's legislative history supports no such conclusion.
At least two possible explanations can be derived from the removal
of the Specter amendment, which proposed to codify the Second Cir-
115. Id. The 3rd Circuit has also adopted this view in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F. 3d
185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999). See Eugene P. Caiola, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the
Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309 (2000); Janine C. Guido,
Seeking Enlightenment From Above: Circuit Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act's
Heightened Pleading Requirement., 66 BROOK. L. REv. 501, 542 (2000).
116. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
117. Id. at 978.
118. Id. at 978-79.
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cuit tests. The interpretation that the Ninth Circuit adopted is that
Congress intended to reject Second Circuit precedent as a basis for
the interpretation of the "strong inference" provision. 11 9 Indeed, Su-
preme Court precedent suggests that when Congress expressly de-
clines to adopt specific statutory language, "its action strongly
militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it
expressly declined to enact. ' 120  With the deletion of the Specter
amendment, courts could presume that Congress did not intend for
them to follow the Second Circuit tests.' 2' However, looking at a
failed legislative proposal may not be a solid basis to ascertain the
intent of Congress.122
Other plausible explanations for the deletion of the Specter amend-
ment exist. The Specter amendment was not dropped from the
PSLRA because Congress wanted to reject the Second Circuit's stan-
dard because motive and opportunity are irrelevant or that at all times
the Second Circuit standard was too low. One possible reason for its
removal was that Congress felt the Specter Amendment did not effec-
tively represent this standard.12 3
Additionally, Senator D'Amato's strong objections to the adoption
of the Specter amendment provide other reasons. 124 His opposition
was not based on a belief that the test was inappropriate to demon-
strate scienter, but rather was based on a fear that it would cause a
"straitjacketing" of courts by codifying this test. 25 Since Senator
D'Amato was one of the most vocal members of that Committee to
oppose the amendment, it is plausible to conclude that the Conference
Committee adopted D'Amato's view that codification of the "motive
119. Id.
120. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
121. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978, reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 195 F. 3d 591
(9th Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe joint conference committee ... declined to incorporate the Specter
Amendment in the final version of the [Reform Act]. In doing so, they implicitly rejected the
Second Circuit's two-pronged test.") (citation omitted) (relying on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Pav-
ing Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (If the conference committee expressly declined to adopt pro-
posed statutory language, its action "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress
intended the result that it expressly declined to enact.").
122. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 187
(1994) (warning that "failed legislative proposals are 'a particularly dangerous ground"' for stat-
utory interpretation and that "several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from [congres-
sional] inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the
offered change").
123. See 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Sen. Dodd's statement that the
Specter Amendment did not really follow the guidance of the Second Circuit and thus was the
reason it was taken out.).
124. See 141 CoNG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
125. Id.
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and opportunity" language would limit courts' evaluation of whether
facts that are plead would survive dismissal, not that motive and op-
portunity are irrelevant.1 26
The Ninth Circuit also incorrectly placed significant weight on a cer-
tain passage of text, in the Conference Report and its accompanying
note, in finding that the legislative history of the PSLRA rejected the
motive and opportunity analysis. 127 This specific passage states that:
"[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing
pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Cir-
cuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard."' 128 The accompa-
nying note, footnote twenty-three, then adds: "[f]or this reason, the
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard cer-
tain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." 129 The
report of the Senate Banking Committee took the same approach but
went on to state "courts may find this body of [Second Circuit case]
law instructive."' 130 Although the Silicon Graphics court cited this
quote, it failed to account for this language.' 3'
The Ninth Circuit oversimplifies the explanation of this passage and
assumes that, when Congress said it intended to "strengthen existing
pleading requirements," it must have meant above the standard in the
Second Circuit. Similar to the Specter analysis above, it is more likely
that Congress refused to .codify the Second Circuit case law because it
wanted to give courts the flexibility to address facts that show scienter
on a case-by-case basis and that the Second Circuit's case law did not
always serve purposes of the heightened pleading standard. This con-
clusion is strengthened in light of Senator Dodd's position that the
decision to take the guidance of the Second Circuit out of the PSLRA
was based on the assumption that courts would look to Second Circuit
case law for guidance anyway. 32 A better explanation is that Con-
gress sought to achieve uniformity by strengthening the weaker stan-
dards and aligning them with what was considered, at the time, to be
the most stringent standard, that of the Second Circuit. Congress,
126. See Caiola, supra note 115, at 349.
127. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978.
128. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
129. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23.
130. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995).
131. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978.
132. See 141 CONG. REc. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Senator Dodd shed light on the
Committee's position when he stated: "We have left out the guidance. That does not mean you
disregard it.").
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however, did not adopt all Second Circuit applications of its
standard.133
In his veto, President Clinton voiced his apprehension that this leg-
islation would raise the pleading standard above that previously
adopted in the Second Circuit. 134 The Ninth Circuit took the position
that, in its decision to override the President's veto, "Congress ...
provided very strong evidence of its intent to go beyond the Second
Circuit standard.' 135 The Ninth Circuit assumed that, when the veto
was overridden, Congress agreed with Clinton's interpretation that
the Reform Act adopted a pleading standard higher than the Second
Circuit's standard.' 36 Nowhere in the record is there evidence that
this was in fact the understanding of Congress.137
Of significant importance to this analysis is recognition that the
Congressional override of Clinton's veto was based on their belief that
the PSLRA had in fact already adopted, at least in part, the Second
Circuit's standard, rather than their desire to adopt a pleading stan-
dard higher than that existing in the Second Circuit. 38 During the
Senate's veto debate, "the sponsors of the bill explicitly disagreed with
the President's interpretation and reaffirmed their own view that, con-
trary to the President's belief, the Reform Act's pleading standard was
"faithful to the Second Circuit's test." 139 Illustrative of this is Senator
Dodd's statements that the PSLRA had "met the second circuit [sic]
133. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the Second
Circuit's standard was the most stringent pleading standard prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA); see also Olson, supra note 14, at 1108.
134. 141 CONG. REc. H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) ("I believe that the pleading require-
ments of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unaccept-
able procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am prepared to
support the high pleading standards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - the
highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in
the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not
prepared to accept that.").
135. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
136. Id. at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. How persuasive can the Ninth Circuit be in adopting a position based on Congress' inter-
pretation of Clinton's veto, which was based on a questionable interpretation of Congressional
intent and an ambiguous statute? It seems that there are too many variable interpretations to
reach a conclusion that carries much weight.
138. See Lerach & lsaacson, supra note 35, at 953-54 (discussing how the veto debate con-
firmed that Congress intended to codify the Second Circuit standard).
139. Id. at 953-55 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S19150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995)) (Senator
Domenici: "The President objected to the pleading standard. Yet it is the Second Circuit's
pleading standard."); 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Senator Dodd: the Re-
form Act "met the [Slecond [Clircuit standard"); 141 CONG. REC. H15219 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995) (Representative Lofgren: "The President says he supports the [S]econd [Clircuit standard
for pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this bill."); 141 CONG. REC. H15218 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1995) (Representative Moran: "We know we are going to have the Second Circuit stan-
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standard" and that the Committee expected the courts to look to the
Second Circuit's case law for guidance. 140 Later, in a further attempt
to ease any fears that courts would ignore the Second Circuit prece-
dent because the Specter amendment was dropped, Senator Dodd
went on to say: "we have met the second circuit [sic] standard here...
[w]e have left out the guidance. That does not mean you disregard
it.'' 4 Since the Second Circuit pre-PSLRA standard may have been
too lenient in some cases to curb abusive litigation and was not uni-
form, Congress and the President may simply have been talking about
two different standards.
The Ninth Circuit raises the scienter level to 'deliberate reckless-
ness' as its means to heighten the pleading standard. The Ninth Cir-
cuit makes its pleading standard more stringent than the Second
Circuit's by raising the scienter level to be pled, rather than requiring
a greater showing than strong inference of state of mind. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit parts company with either the Second or Sixth Circuit
on scienter level, not pleading standard. The Ninth Circuit is mis-
taken in raising the pleading standard by raising the level of scienter.
The PSLRA's pleading standard does not expressly define the state of
mind to be alleged. While the legislative history and statutory struc-
ture can be read to mean that Congress did expect 'recklessness' to
not be sufficient for a rule 10b-5 claim, more likely Congress left the
question of state of mind to the judiciary to resolve. 142 What the
Ninth Circuit did was make the pleading standard in the PSLRA more
stringent than the Second Circuit's by raising the scienter level to be
pled to "deliberate reckless," but only requiring the same strong infer-
ence of this heightened scienter level. As even the Ninth Circuit has
conceded, "the PSLRA did not alter the substantive requirements for
scienter under Section 10(b). ' ' 143 The plain language of Section 21D
(b)(2) leaves the scienter issues unresolved. Even a panel of the Ninth
Circuit has concluded that its heightened scienter standard only ap-
dard applied, and that in fact when legislation is at variance with legislative history or report
language, that it is the bill itself that prevails.").
140. See 141 CONG. REc. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21 1995) (Senator Dodd's statement that
other courts were expected to look to Second Circuit precedent in interpreting the pleading
standard).
141. Id. See also Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 35, at 899 ("A careful review of the legislative
history of section 21D(b)(2) shows that Congress intended to adopt the 'strong-inference' plead-
ing standard from Second Circuit case law and to leave courts free to seek guidance from the
existing precedents whenever appropriate.").
142. See Olson, supra note 14, at 1122-26.
143. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
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plied to pleading but not proof, so for liability, recklessness is
sufficient. 144
The Ninth Circuit standard gives rise to new uncertainty. When the
Ninth Circuit applies its new standard, it makes the same particular-
ized assessment of allegations as the Second and Sixth Circuit. In
Silicon Graphics, the company reported a 45% increase in revenue for
fiscal year 1995 and then projected similar results in the future.145 At
the same time, the company introduced plans for a new computer that
would help maintain its current and future success. 146 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the company began having quality control problems with the pri-
mary component of this new computer.' 47 The plaintiffs alleged that
despite having knowledge of such problems, the company and six ex-
ecutives made misleading statements and told investors that produc-
tion was continuing on schedule in an effort to inflate the company's
stock price while the executives sold their shares for large profits. 4 8
As two examples of this particularized Assessment of Allegations,
the Ninth Circuit looked at part of the complaint entitled "Basis of
Allegations" and the defendants' stock trading. Under "Basis of Alle-
gations," plaintiffs alleged
[t]he foregoing based upon the investigation of their counsel, which
included a review of SGI's SEC filings, securities analysts reports
and advisories about the Company, press releases issued by the
Company, media reports about the Company and ... that substan-
tial evidentiary support will exist for the allegations [] after a rea-
sonable opportunity for discovery.' 49
The Ninth Circuit rightly concludes that these conclusory allegations,
without "adequate corroborating details,' 50 cannot meet the pleading
standards.
The Ninth Circuit also examined whether the defendants' stock
trading before the negative news was announced might provide a
strong inference of scienter. The mere fact that defendants traded
before the announcement was not enough. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
looked at how typical the trades were, how much stock the defendants
retained and that the defendant who sold the most had special circum-
stances. Ultimately, what the Ninth Circuit did was take a particular-
144. Id.
145. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 980.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 979-80.
149. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 985.
150. Id.
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ized look at the allegations of scienter much like the Second and Sixth
Circuits.
Other than stating that its standard is more stringent than the Sec-
ond Circuit's, the Ninth Circuit provides little guidance for how lower
courts should evaluate pleading allegations. Plaintiffs are to plead
"deliberate recklessness," but it is unclear how this standard is differ-
ent from the generally recognized recklessness standard. This uncer-
tainty in application, particularly in a fact driven inquiry, cannot lead
to predictability.
While it remains clear that the PSLRA's heightened pleading stan-
dard is anything but precise, it is equally clear that the Ninth Circuit
has adopted a standard that lies somewhere outside the acceptable
scope of interpretation. 151
V. CONCLUSION
The text and legislative history of the PSLRA do not lead to a con-
clusive answer regarding the proper interpretation of the heightened
scienter pleading standard. Considering the totality of the legislative
history, along with the language of the statute and the goals of Con-
gress in enacting the PSLRA, the evidence strongly suggests that the
Sixth Circuit's position should be followed. The Sixth Circuit lays out
a test that adequately accommodates the role of motive and opportu-
nity. There is no reason to continue motive and opportunity as a sepa-
rate test. When the Second Circuit restrictively applies what
constitutes motive and opportunity, it adds nothing to the approach of
the Sixth Circuit.
The view of the Sixth Circuit is far superior to that of the Ninth
Circuit in pleading. The Ninth Circuit raises the scienter level to de-
liberate recklessness as its method of making pleading securities fraud
more difficult. However, the plain language of the statute did not
change the required level of scienter.
151. Although not particularly persuasive, but of further interest, is the language that is found
in the Congressional Record from the debate over the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act. In it, Congress made clear that their intent "was expressly stated during the legislative
debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate overriding the President's veto, that
the PSLRA establish a uniform standard on pleading requirements by adopting the pleading
standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(1998); Laura R. Smith, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative History: Which Will
Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter After The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Of
1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 583 (1999) (quoting The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998) (The Securities Litigation Reform Act was
passed in response to the fact that plaintiffs were filing their securities suits in state court rather
than federal court in an effort to avoid the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.).
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As with any disagreement among the circuits regarding the inter-
pretation of federal legislation, the Supreme Court seems to be the
appropriate and logical venue for resolution. However, plaintiffs in
these actions may be content to fight their battles at the District and
Circuit Court levels rather than asking the Supreme Court to resolve
the conflict between the Circuits. A Supreme Court decision in favor
of the Ninth Circuit view will not only devastate the rights of share-
holders, but will also destroy the plaintiff's securities bar and in turn
seriously hinder private securities regulation.
In the absence of judicial intervention, the only course that can be
taken in reconciling the split is through legislative action. Currently
there is legislation pending in Congress that addresses some of the
problems found in the PSLRA. 152 However, Congress may not be ca-
pable of producing a resolution. As is apparent in the Congressional
record of the PSLRA, many times the members of Congress do not
agree on the application and interpretation of legislation. When legis-
lators perceive a need to compromise they can, among other strate-
gies, "obscur[e] the particular meaning of a statute, allowing different
legislators to read the obscured provisions the way they wish.' ' 53
Whatever happens, the resolution is almost certain to lead to similar
debates.
152. See Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 3829, 107th Cong.
(introduced on Feb. 28, 2002) (The "Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of
2002," sponsored by Representative Bart Stupak seeks to repeal the provisions of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act that limit
private securities actions, and other purposes.); see also Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933,
107th Cong. (introduced on Feb. 12, 2002) (among other things, this bill, the Investor Protection
Act of 2002, repeals the scienter requirement limiting joint and several liability for damages to
covered persons who knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws.).
153. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002).
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